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 Cultural diplomacy is de!ned as the “exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations 
and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”1 Culture, which is said to be the whole complex of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group, includes not only arts and 
letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental human rights, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.2 It consists of “language, 
ideas, beliefs, customs, taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies, and symbols.”3 “Every 
culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people’s traditions and forms of expression are its most 
e"ective means of demonstrating its presence in the world.”4 Culture is “both a function and source of identity.”5 Language is 
the most salient feature of the culture of a people. It is the most “inherent characteristic of a nation.”6 According to a Greek 
professor of linguistics, George Babiniotis, “there is no other way, more direct, more substantial, no shorter way to get to know 
a people than by learning their language. #e language of a people is the way they conceive, classify and express the world. 
Every national language is another taxonomy of the world, another approach, a total of choices that give a distinctive value to 
each language, the value of the collective expression of a whole nation.”7
 Sir Anthony Parsons, a distinguished British diplomat, pointed out some of the advantages of using culture as an 
instrument of diplomacy. “It is dazzling obvious,” he said. “If you are thoroughly familiar with someone else’s language and 
literature, if you know and love his country, its cities, its arts and its people, you will be instinctively disposed, all other things 
being equal, to buy goods from him rather than from a less well known source, to support him actively when you consider 
him right and to avoid punishing him too !ercely when you regard him as being wrong.”8
 According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. world cultural attractiveness is, inter alia, facilitated by the rapid spread of 
the English language as an international common language.9 #us, it could be argued that the dissemination of the English 
language in non-Anglophone countries facilitates U.S. so$ power, that is, its ability to get what it wants through attraction 
rather than coercion or payments. In this context and in view of the crisis in transatlantic relations experienced during the 
Iraqi war, it is interesting to examine the power in%uence exerted by the English language and American culture in France and 
Germany. To investigate the e"ectiveness of U.S. cultural diplomacy is also undoubtedly intriguing.
 First of all, it is to be noted that there has been an increase in English language knowledge in both France 
and Germany. As illustrated in the chart below, from the German uni!cation in 1990 to December 2005 when the last 
Eurobarometer survey with regard to Europeans and their languages took place (EB 64.3), English language knowledge in 
both countries has increased.10
1 Milton C. Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey (Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), 1. 
2 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, July 26–August 6, 1982, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/
en/!les/12762/11295421661mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en.pdf.
3 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Encyclopedia (2000), s.v. “culture.”
4 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, July 26–August 6, 1982,  http://portal.unesco.org/culture/
en/!les/35197/11919410061mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en.pdf.
5 Bill Ashcro$ and Pal Ahluwalia, Edward Said, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 85. 
6 George Babiniotis, “#e Greek language: its contribution to basic concepts of the European civilization,” http://www.babiniotis.gr/wmt/webpages/index.php?
lid=2&pid=7&catid=M&apprec=23.
7 Ibid.
8 Anthony Parsons as quoted in Martin Davidson, “#e British Council in China: cultural relations between the UK and China,” http://www.britishcouncil.
org/new/PageFiles/9532/new-MD_speeches_CulturalrelationsUKandChina_#ree%20Gorges%20MuseumChongqingChina_Jan09.pdf.
9  Zbigniew Brzezinski, !e Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership? (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 185.
10 Eurobarometer survey 64.3, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.
Figure 1: #e English language knowledge tendency in France and Germany
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 More particularly, in 1990 the percentage of English language knowledge in France was 29.4 percent while, in 
November-December 2005, it was 34.9 percent. !ere was a 5.5 percent increase in France whereas there was an increase 
as high as 25.3 percent in Germany. In 1990, English language knowledge was 26.9 percent in the uni"ed Germany (this 
percentage is slightly lower than that of France in the same year because of the extremely low percentage of English language 
knowledge in East Germany, 14.5 percent, while it was actually 39.6 percent in West Germany). In November-December 2005, 
English language knowledge in uni"ed Germany amounted to 52.2 percent, 43.5 percent in East Germany, and 57.1 percent 
West Germany, respectively.11 !us, the actual increase in English language knowledge was 29 percent in East Germany 
whereas there was 17.5 percent increase in West Germany. 
 In May-June 2005 when another Eurobarometer survey (EB 63.4) took place, which examined, inter alia, English 
language knowledge, the percentage of English language knowledge was 33.2 percent (336 out of 1012) in France, and 47.6 
percent (723 out of 1520) in Germany, respectively.  Actually, this Eurobarometer meant to examine the European citizens’ 
knowledge, and opinions on issues such as the European Union policies (its foreign policy, security policy, etc.), their fears 
concerning the loss of their national identity and culture, as well as their fears regarding the future of their national language 
within the European Union. Another issue examined was their attitude toward U.S. role in major international issues such 
as world peace, the "ght against terrorism, the "ght against poverty, environment protection, etc. More speci"cally, by 
dividing the respondents of this Eurobarometer survey 63.4 into two categories English-speaking and non-English speaking 
and checking their perceptions and attitudes toward the U.S. role in world peace, the "ght against terrorism, world poverty, 
environment protection, etc., what became evident was that those French and Germans who spoke English as a foreign 
language did not have a more positive opinion and attitude toward the United States than those who did not speak English 
(see Tables 1, 2, 3, & 4 below). What is more, in certain cases they were even more critical (see Tables 1, 3, & 4 below). For 
instance, of the 336 English-speaking French, only 41 people (12.2 percent) answered that the United States plays a positive 
role in world peace. On the contrary, of 676 non English speaking French 117 people, that is, 17.3 percent stated that U.S. role 
in world peace is positive. In Germany, of the 723 English-speaking Germans, only 132 people (18.3 percent) view U.S. role 
in this issue as positive whereas of the 797 non-English speaking Germans, 187 people (23.5 percent) felt that the U.S. role is 
positive [Appendix A].
 Similarly, when the attitude of the French and Germans with English language skills with regard to an E.U. foreign 
policy being independent of that of the United States was examined, this was not positively a#ected by the language factor (see 
Table 5).
 Furthermore, the English-speaking French and Germans were not afraid that their national language would be less 
spoken in the European Union of the then 25 member states or that their national identity and culture would be lost (see 
Tables 6 & 7).
 But why does the power in$uence exerted by the United States through the English language and their culture not 
produce the desirable e#ects?
 First of all, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that is, the lack of dread, as well as 
the inability to quantify “so% power” diplomacy achievements resulted in the elimination of the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) cultural programs and to its merging into the State Department and essentially, to its abolition.12 !e mission 
of the USIA, which was founded in 1953 as an independent foreign a#airs agency within the executive branch of the U.S. 
government and which was known overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS), was “to understand, inform, 
and in$uence foreign publics in promotion of U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and 
U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad.”13 !e closure of the USIA America Houses in Germany, whose aim was to 
“re-educate” the German people a%er the World War II so that Germany would become a democratic state again, is one such 
typical post war change.14 Having ful"lled their aim, several of the numerous America Houses (only in the early 1950s there 
were as many as 36 Houses) had to be closed because of "nancial reasons.15 Some of them could be saved by the "nancial 
support of the German Government and they were transformed into “German-American Institutes”.16 It is interesting that 
Germany was more interested in maintaining them than the United States. !us, today there are only 10 German-American 
11  Eurobarometer survey 63.4, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.
12  Cynthia Schneider, “!ere’s an Art to Telling the World About America,”Washington Post, August 25, 2002, http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/schneider.
pdf .
13  United States Information Agency’s O&ce of Public Liaison, “USIA: An Overview,” http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview.
14  Kerstin Fickel, “Amerika Häuser und Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute in der BRD,” http://www.bibliothek-saur.de/1999_2/194.pdf.
15  Ibid.
16  Kerstin Fickel, “Amerika Häuser und Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute in der BRD,” http://www.bibliothek-saur.de/1999_2/194.pdf.
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Institutes le!.17  
 In France, there is only one United States-France bi-national center, the Franco-American Institute in Rennes, 
founded in 1961 by the United States Embassy in Paris and the City of Rennes in order to strengthen the friendship and 
mutual understanding between the United States and France.18 Interestingly, in its November-December 2005 newsletter, the 
Franco-American Institute made an appeal for funding, complaining that “unfortunately, Art and Culture are rarely amongst 
the top priorities of national governments, but we strongly believe that peace and liberty can only be achieved if we better 
understand each other, if we "ght against ignorance and prejudices, if we share and confront views in talking about them 
through art and books. #ese are the reasons why we strongly believe in our work here at the Institute, a small and creative 
community which thrives by exchanging and sharing our cultures, achieved with your help and support.”19 #us, the Franco-
American Institute sta$ asked people in Rennes to write down why they appreciate the Institute in order to present it to 
American and French foundations and Institutions. 
 As Cynthia Schneider points out, “September 11 found U.S. public diplomacy apparatus underfunded, undervalued, 
and demoralized.”20 A!er 9/11, the U.S. unilateralism in the 2003 invasion of Iraq spurred anti-Americanism worldwide and, 
especially, in Europe where bi-national centers, apart from those mentioned above, operate in only two other countries: Spain 
and Greece. Interestingly, in France, as it was mentioned before, there is only one bi-national center operating in the region of 
Bretagne, while the 10 bi-national centers that are le! to operate in Germany are mostly the result of the Germans’ interest in 
keeping them.  
 Examining the cultural activities of the aforementioned bi-national centers from 2003 to 2008, one can observe 
that the Franco-American Institute in Rennes did not organize cultural events speci"cally related to the Iraqi war and the 
transatlantic ri!. #is, however, does not apply to the bi-national centers in Germany. #e German-American cultural 
institutes organized a series of events such as lectures, discussions, book presentations, etc. that focused on the Iraqi war, the 
transatlantic relations, anti-Americanism, the European Security Strategy, the U.S. neoconservative foreign policy, etc. (see 
Tables 8 & 9). 
 All these cultural events follow the political events, that is the transatlantic ri!, a!er the Iraqi war. Public diplomacy 
and its linchpin, cultural diplomacy21, should aim at “building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment 
for government policies.”22 Cultural diplomacy “is not a bandage to be applied a!er the damage is done.”23 #is is not to say 
that the work over time done by these institutes is to be neglected. However, if someone studies carefully the work done by the 
United Kingdom and its main public diplomacy organization, the British Council, he or she can infer that Britain conducts 
systematic and long-term cultural diplomacy (cf. Strategy Plan 2010, Transatlantic Network 2020), while the British Council 
itself assesses and regularly measures the quality of its work (cf. Annual Reports). Also, the Foreign Commonwealth O%ce 
assesses the British Council’s impact and value for money. Britain provides an unrivalled expertise in this "eld.
 However, one should not ignore that, as Joseph Nye cautions, “so! power—like all power—must be taken in context;” 
that is, U.S. “cultural features may be attractive in Asia but repulsive in the Middle East.”24 According to Shirley Williams, 
“Europe’s military strength, that is, its ‘hard power’ may be derisory, its ‘so! power,’ however, is formidable indeed.”25 Nye 
argues that the European Union has tremendous so! power both in terms of individual nations and as a block of nations.26 
European art, literature, music, fashion, and cuisine have always acted as cultural magnets. #e majority of the most widely 
spoken languages in the world are European: English, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, German, and French. As David Graddol 
argues, “within Europe there are several countries with colonial histories and aspirations to protect their language, culture and
17  #ese German-American Institutes are located in Stuttgart (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Zentrum/James F. Byrnes Institut Stuttgart), Freiburg (Carl-Schurz-
Haus/Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut e.V. Freiburg), Heidelberg (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Heidelberg), Tübingen (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut 
Tübingen), Munich (Bayerisch-Amerikanisches Zentrum Münich), Nuremberg (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Nürnberg), Hamburg (Amerikazentrum 
Hamburg), Saarbrücken (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Saarbrücken), Kiel (Amerika-Gesellscha! Schleswig-Holstein e.V. - Kennedy Infozentrum Kiel) 
and in Cologne, the recently reopened Amerika Haus e.V. Nordrhein-Westfalen. See United States Diplomatic Mission to Germany, “German-American 
Cultural Institutions,” http://germany.usembassy.gov/germany/gaci.html.
18  #e Franco-American Institute of Rennes, http://www.ifa-rennes.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=15&lang=en. 
19  #e Franco-American Institute of Rennes, “Newsletter November-December 2005,” e-mailed to author, November 10, 2005.  
20  Cynthia Schneider, “#ere’s an Art to Telling the World About America,” Washington Post, August 25, 2002, http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/schneider.
pdf.
21  U.S. Department of State, Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy: !e Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, September 2005, http://iwp.uiowa.edu/about/CulturalDiplomacyReport.pdf.
22  Joseph S. Nye, “#e New Public Diplomacy,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye79/English.
23  Ibid.
24  Joseph S. Nye, So" Power: !e Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public A$airs, 2004). 
25  Shirley Williams, “So! Europe must come into its own,” Independent, April 13, 2003, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/so!-europe-
must-come-into-its-own-594266.html.
26  Joseph S. Nye, So" Power: !e Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public A$airs, 2004).  
!"#$%&"'&()*+)%$
4
Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol2/iss1/3
!"
economic activities worldwide—such countries include France, … and Germany”27 or as Zbigniew Brzezinski better puts it, 
there are active geostrategic players, that is, “states that have the capacity and the will to exercise power or in!uence beyond 
their borders in order to alter—to a degree that a"ects America’s interests – the existing geopolitical state of a"airs.”28 
 France and Germany fall into the above category and the United States’ ine"ective exercise of power in!uence 
through their language and culture is better explained by factors such as the two continental states’ bulk of power in economic, 
political, and cultural terms. #ey are the two most in!uential countries of the European Union. Despite their di"erences, 
in the context of the European Union there is a strong cooperation between the two. France is the European Union’s largest 
country by area29 and a nuclear power.30 It has the third largest number of nuclear weapons (warheads) in the world31 and 
the largest number of nuclear power plants in the European Union.32 It is a charter member of the United Nations (UN) 
and holds one of the $ve permanent seats of the U.N. Security Council.33 It is also a member of numerous international 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of Twenty (G-20), the Group of Eight (G-8), etc.34 
Germany is Europe’s largest economy, the world’s fourth largest economy by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the $%h largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP).35 It is the second largest exporter and the third largest importer 
of goods in the world.36 Although it is not a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it is a member of all major 
international organizations: UN, NATO, OECD, G-20, G-8, etc.37 As far as culture is concerned, both countries have enjoyed 
a signi$cant role as centers of high culture not only in Europe but also worldwide. More speci$cally, France has featured 
some of the world’s most in!uential writers and thinkers such as Descartes, Pascal, Rousseau, Voltaire, Balzac, Baudelaire, 
Sartre, and Camus, to name a few.38 Moreover, it has given the art world the works of Renoir, Monet, Cezanne, Gauguin, 
Matisse, etc.39 Germany is also known as “das Land der Dichter und Denker” (the land of poets and thinkers).40 Famous 
German philosophers include Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, etc.41 Furthermore, 
as birthplace of Johann Sebastian Bach, Ludwig van Beethoven, Johannes Brahms, and Richard Wagner, among others, 
Germany’s gi% to classical music is unquestionable.42 What is more, both France and Germany export their national culture 
and language to other countries (c.f. Organisation internationale de la francophonie, Goethe Institut). 
 In this strong cultural context, it is inevitable that both French and Germans have developed strong national and 
cultural identities. As aforementioned, both French and German people who speak English as a foreign language are not afraid 
that their national identity and culture will be lost within a supranational organization such as the European Union (see Table 
7). Moreover, as foreign language learning is concerned, they adopt a utilitarian approach. When English-speaking French and 
German people were asked about the reasons why they think it is important that young people should learn a 
27  David Graddol, “Global English, Global Culture,” in Redesigning English: new texts, new identities, edited by Sharon Goodman and David Graddol (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 192. 
28  Zbigniew Brzezinski, !e Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 40.
29  “EU member countries: France,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/france/index_en.htm. 
30  “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance?” http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
31  Ibid.
32  “Nuclear power plants in Europe,” European Nuclear Society, http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm.
33  “Country Pro$le: France,” Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pro$les/France.pdf.
34  Ibid.
35  “Germany,” !e CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html.
36  “Country Comparisons: Exports,” !e CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html. Also 
“International Trade Statistics,” #e World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr598_e.htm.
37  “Country Pro$le: Germany,” Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pro$les/Germany.pdf.
38  “EU member countries: France,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/france/index_en.htm.
39  Ibid.
40  “German culture,” http://www.germanlanguageguide.com/german/culture/.
41  Ibid.
42  “EU member countries: Germany,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany/index_en.htm.
43  Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 49, also at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/35.pdf.
44  Eurydice, “#e information network on education in Europe,” in Key Data on Teaching Languages at School in Europe (Eurydice: 2005 Edition), 35. 
45  Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm.
46  “France: Language Research,” U.S. English Foundation Research, http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.
asp?CID=59&TID=1.
47  Law No. 94-665 of August 2, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm For the Toubon Law in the 
French version, see Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l’emploi de la langue française, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/a&chTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT0
00005616341&dateTexte=20110215.
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foreign language, the culture associated with the language was listed as the ultimate reason among French respondents; the 
Germans did not consider it as an important reason either (see Table 10).
 In addition, the status attributed to English as a foreign language within the national education system and the 
existence of an institutional framework for the protection of national language use, as is the case with France, seem to be some 
other factors accounting for the ine!ective power in"uence exerted by the English language and culture. 
 #e European Union supports multilingualism, a policy that, according to Mark Leonard, the French pursued and 
strove for when they realized that if the French language “were not to be the $rst foreign language learned around the world, 
it was important to ensure that more than one foreign language would be learned.”43 While in most E.U. countries the learning 
of English is mandatory at a particular stage of compulsory education, as is the case with Germany, in France, the status of 
English within the national education system does not di!er from that of the other languages included in the curriculum; 
it is optional.44 In addition, in France there is a law (Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994) that stipulates that the French language 
comprises a key element in the personality and heritage of France,45 and it lays down its compulsory use in speci$c $elds so 
as to guarantee the French citizens’ right to use their language in certain circumstances of their daily lives.46 #us, French is 
the language of instruction, work, trade, public exchanges, etc.47 #is law, which is widely known as the Toubon Law, named 
a%er the French minister of culture who introduced it, also mandates, with few exceptions, the compulsory use of the French 
language in all the broadcasted audiovisual programs.48
 Furthermore, the policy of “cultural exemption” that permits E.U. member-states to restrict cultural imports of 
non-European audiovisual products and the practice of dubbing audiovisual products as an ethnocentric adaptation of 
the “foreign” to the target country’s cultural values, as a process of eliminating “foreignness” and mitigating the power of 
the source country’s cultural images, contribute greatly to the moderation of the power of the English language and U.S. 
culture.49 More speci$cally, in 1989, in an e!ort to protect and promote the European cultural identity, the European Union 
passed the Television Without Frontiers directive,50 which requires that E.U. member-states reserve a majority (51 percent) 
of entertainment broadcast transmission time for programs of European origin.51 France, which lobbied the hardest to pass 
the E.U. directive, has since implemented the most stringent quotas within its national system.52 France also imposes quotas 
on broadcasted musical works under a related law (Loi n° 94-88 du 1er février 199453), which requires that a minimum 
percentage of French language songs be played on radio and television.54 As far as Germany is concerned, the E.U. Television 
Without Frontiers directive is also “playing a particularly prominent role.”55 Although there are no o&cial quotas to which the 
broadcasters must adhere, as is the case with France, Article 6 of the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement of 31st August 1991(as 
amended by the Sixth Act to Amend the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement) stipulates that “television broadcasters shall reserve 
the greater part of total time scheduled for the transmission of feature $lms, television plays, series, documentaries, and 
comparable productions for European works in accordance with European law.”56
 For the French, “cultural products and services—$lms, TV programs, books, music, etc.—in addition to o!ering 
entertainment, are ideological items that embody social values and messages, and consequently in"uence the organization of 
entire social systems.”57 #us, “borderless information and the entertainment media are increasingly being viewed not as
43  Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 49, also at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/35.pdf.
44  Eurydice, “#e information network on education in Europe,” Key Data on Teaching Languages at School in Europe (Eurydice: 2005 Edition), 35. 
45  Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm.
46  “France: Language Research,” U.S. English Foundation Research, http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.
asp?CID=59&TID=1.
47  Law No. 94-665 of August 2, 1994 relative to the use of the French language, http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm For the Toubon Law in the 
French version, see Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l’emploi de la langue française, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/a&chTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT0
00005616341&dateTexte=20110215.
48  However, some exceptions are provided for musical works and original version $lms. See Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French 
language, http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm. 
49  “Cultural exemption” or else known as “cultural exception.” See “Activities of the European Union: Audiovisual and Media policy,” http://europa.eu/pol/av/
index_en.htm.
50  For more information on the TVWF directive, see: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24101_en.htm.
51  Karen Rinaman, “French $lm quotas and cultural protectionism,” http://www1.american.edu/ted/frenchtv.htm.
52  Ibid.
53  For more information on this law, see: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/a&chTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000363209.
54  “France: Language Research,” U.S. English Foundation Research, http://www.usefoundation.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.
asp?CID=59&TID=1.
55  Council of Europe/ERICarts, Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, “Country policy pro$le: Germany: 4.2.6 Media pluralism and 
content diversity,” http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/germany.php?aid=426.
56  Ibid.
57  Karen Rinaman, “French $lm quotas and cultural protectionism,” http://www1.american.edu/ted/frenchtv.htm
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positive forces for integration but as divisive mechanisms that threaten national and cultural sovereignty.”58 !e French feel 
obliged to maintain and protect their cultural environment (their system of symbols, images, words, concepts, stories, and 
values) with the same conviction that one may hold for his or her physical environment.59
 Moreover, as each country cultivates a di"erent tradition of translating audiovisual products, and the decision as 
to which audiovisual translation mode to choose is by no means arbitrary but stems from several factors, such as historical 
circumstances, traditions, the technique to which the audience is accustomed, the cost, as well as the position of both the 
target and the source cultures in an international context, the translation practice adopted for audiovisual products by both 
France and Germany is dubbing and not subtitling.60 Subtitling, which consists of the written rendition of the source text 
speech, whether dialogue or narration, into the target language, “allows viewers to access the original speech.”61 E"ectively, it 
empowers viewers who have some knowledge of the source language to monitor and criticize the translation.62 It is the “form 
that alters the source text to the least possible extent and enables the target audience to experience the foreign and be aware 
of its ‘foreignness’ at all times.”63 In addition, this exposure of the viewers to a foreign language has been found to promote the 
target audience’s interest in other cultures.64 Dubbing, on the other hand, reduces the amount of processing e"ort required on 
part of the audience and is the most e"ective method to translate programs addressed at children or viewers with a restricted 
degree of literacy.65 However, “the transmission of culture-speci#c terms and values in dubbed audiovisual texts is a highly 
problematic issue.”66 “In principle, the re-voicing of the dialogue allows for an easy domestication of the original text, including 
the replacement of source cultural references by their naturalizing counterparts” of the target culture.67 It is considered to be 
an ethnocentric adaptation of the “foreign” to the target country’s cultural values and the method that modi#es the source text 
the most. !ere is no doubt that any form of audiovisual translation chosen “ultimately plays a unique role in developing both 
national identities and national stereotypes.”68
 What also becomes evident is that, although U.S. culture permeates the globe, it, as Joseph Nye claims, “does 
not always $ow into other societies unchanged—nor does it always have political e"ects.”69 As Nye argues, “the ideas and 
information that enter global networks are ‘downloaded’ in the context of national politics and local cultures, which act as 
selective #lters and modi#ers of what arrives.”70 Others such as Stephen M. Walt claim that the United States “cast a cultural 
and ideological shadow on the rest of the world” and therefore, other states use strategies to counter it.71
 As the world’s only superpower, the United States is “viewed as the driving force behind globalization.”72 Although 
globalization has economic roots, one can no way ignore its broader cultural and political dimensions.73 A “negative e"ect of 
globalization is cultural assimilation.”74 In fact, globalization is said to be “nothing more than the imposition of the American 
culture on the entire world.”75 Cultural imperialism, Americanization, or Coca-colonization are some of the terms used to 
describe this phenomenon.
 If cultural imperialism is conceived either as the forceful imposition of one nation’s culture on another country, or 
as the voluntary acceptance of a foreign culture by the people of another nation, the #ndings of our research show that the 
French and German people who speak English as a foreign language are not instinctively disposed to adopt a more positive 
attitude toward the United States and in certain cases, they are even more critical of the United States rather than their co-
nationals who do not speak English; in that, Nye is con#rmed when he argues that so% power does not stem only from the
58  Ibid.
59  Ibid.
60  Josephine Dries as quoted in Agnieszka Szarkowska, “!e Power of Film Translation,” http://translationjournal.net/journal//32#lm.htm.
61  Mona Baker, ed., Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.
62  Ibid.
63  Agnieszka Szarkowska, “!e Power of Film Translation,” http://translationjournal.net/journal//32#lm.htm.
64  Mona Baker, ed., Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 16.
65  Ibid, 17.
66  Ibid, 18.
67  Ibid.
68  Mona Baker and Braño Hochel, “Dubbing,” in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies, edited by Mona Baker (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998), 76.
69  Joseph S. Nye, !e Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Public A"airs, 2002), 80.
70  Ibid, 80.
71  Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: !e Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 36.
72  Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization and American power,” http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=2431.
73  Global Envision, “Americanization or Globalization?” http://www.globalenvision.org/library/33/1273.
74  Ibid.
75  Ibid.
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!"
language use.76 !e importance of the role of culture in diplomacy and international relations is hereby reversed in that the 
United States seem to be not successful in exerting power in"uence through their culture. However, other countries, in our 
case two signi#cant great powers, seem to have indeed resisted by protecting their own national culture and identity, which 
prove to be not malleable at all.
76  Joseph S. Nye, So! Power: "e Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public A$airs, 2004).  
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